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The aim of this paper is to test whether or not a temporary help service (THS) job benefits workers 
in Japan. By applying the average treatment effect on the treated estimation and its sensitivity tests 
to the Japanese survey data, we obtained the following findings. First, we observed evidence that 
THS work negatively  impacts  the probability of permanent employment  in subsequent waves, 
when compared to directly hired part-time employment. Second, THS workers earn a significantly 
higher hourly wage than those originally unemployed. For those seeking permanent employment in 
particular, THS work provides a quick way to make a living for up to two years. We conclude that 
THS work in Japan has provided a means to obtaining  quick earnings but has not offered a 
stepping-stone to permanent employment. 
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are solely those of the author(s), and do not  represent those of the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry. 1. Introduction 
In the list of new items in the 2010 edition of Fundamental Knowledge of Japanese in Current 
Use, we can find a newly added word that hints at a harsh policy debate on temporary help 
service (THS) workers in Japan:  THS  workers’  cutbacks  (hakengiri  in Japanese). After  the 
Lehman shock, the fact that many THS workers lost their jobs was repeatedly reported by the 
media and was portrayed as THS-worker cutbacks, whereas permanent employees maintained 
relatively stable employment.
6  Some THS workers even lost their homes and formed hobo 
camps. Their serious situation gave the general impression that “THS work is in an extremely 
unstable employment system that makes workers suffer from low wages” (Labour Lawyers 
Association of Japan 2010) and led the Japanese Cabinet to submit an amendment to the Act for 
Dispatched Workers to the ordinary Diet session in April 2010. The submitted bill is expected to 
change  the current provision for  worker dispatching  significantly  if enacted. For example, 
registered THS work would be banned except for 26 fields of work that require specialized 
skills, and worker dispatching to manufacturing firms would also be prohibited. In principle, the 
amendment would tighten regulations  for  worker dispatching to “protect workers,”  a 
demonstrated objective of the bill.   
However, there is no direct evidence to support the idea that the amendment would benefit 
workers in Japan. In fact, some THS workers disagree that the option for THS work should be 
discontinued. According to the Temporary Worker Survey conducted in January 2010, only 9% 
of  THS  workers agree with the amendment while more than one-third of them disagree. 
Economic theories also provide ambiguous pictures of THS work: some show that THS work 
can offer a stepping-stone to permanent employment and others portray it as a trap of endless 
                                                   
6  “Several hundred of these unfortunates congregated in Hibiya Park in the center of Tokyo, forming a 
"hobo camp" that the media named  派遣村  (haken-mura, temp-workers village)” (The Japan Times, 
January 27, 2010).   
2precariousness.  Many studies have  tested the effect of dispatched  work  in Europe and the 
United States, but not in Japan, where direct evidence is urgently needed for the policy debate.
7 
This paper aims to fill this void, by applying the ATT (Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated) method to data from the Japanese survey that was conducted from 2008 through 2010. 
In particular, we consider THS work as a treatment, and compare THS workers’ employment 
status and hourly wage in subsequent waves to those of the comparable control groups. A key to 
identifying the true treatment effect in the ATT method is the CIA (Conditional Independence 
Assumption), which ensures that subjects do not self-select into the treatment. In order to justify 
that our estimates are robust to the specific failures of the CIA, we take an approach proposed 
by Ichino et al. (2008): we simulate the unobservable confounders that can induce self-selection 
and check the sensitivity of the baseline ATT results against including the simulated 
confounders in the propensity score estimations.   
Our results are in line with those from previous research. First, we observe weak evidence 
that a THS job has a negative impact on the probability to be permanently employed in later 
waves, relative to direct-hire part-time jobs. Second, THS workers earn a significantly higher 
hourly wage than those who were originally unemployed do. Especially for those who are 
seeking permanent employment, THS work provides a quick way to make a living at least for 
two years. Our results are robust to possible attrition and selection bias since we never observe 
any positive effects of THS work on future employment prospects in some robustness tests.   
We note that our results are weak in the sense that we assume that  our simulated 
confounders represent the true unobserved factors that could, if any can, induce a selection into 
the treatment. Inasmuch as we have any valid reasons to believe that this assumption is satisfied, 
we can draw the following policy implications from our results: first, THS work offers quick 
                                                   
7  Section 2-2 explains the findings in the previous works.   
3earnings to  those  who  would  otherwise  be  unemployed,  at least in the short  run.  Thus, 
immediate removal of registered THS work, as was proposed in the amendment plan of April 
2010, may hinder the workers’ welfare, especially of those who are not willing to work as 
permanent employees.
8  Second,  THS  work has not offered a stepping-stone to permanent 
employment. Rather, it has offered a trap of endless precariousness to those who are seeking a 
permanent job, if anything. When taken together, these findings do not support the idea of 
removing THS work; rather, they suggest the need to design a fixed-term contract that directs 
those seeking permanent jobs to stepping-stone jobs.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
framework for THS work in Japan, and presents previous findings in the literature. Section 3 
introduces the estimation method and data source, and defines a treatment and its comparison 




2-1. THS workers in Japan 
Japan experienced major regulation changes in worker dispatching from the late 1990s to the 
early 2000s. Until 1999, the Japanese government permitted worker dispatching only in very 
limited cases—i.e., for jobs that require such specialized skills as market research, translation, 
electric calculator programming, and design. This restriction was removed in the 1999 revision 
of the Worker Dispatching Act, whereby worker-dispatching activities were permitted except for 
foreign harbor transport, construction, policing, medical-related, and manufacturing occupations. 
                                                   
8  About 57% of THS workers were not seeking permanent jobs as of wave 1 of the Temporary Worker 
Survey, December 2008. This paper presents the estimation results, separately for a whole sample and a 
sample of those who are seeking permanent jobs. 
4However, the 1999 revision of the Act still limited the dispatching period to one year, aside from 
the 26 fields of occupations that require specialized skills.
9  A 2003 revision of the Act replaced 
this one-year limitation for the dispatching period with a  three-year limitation under some 
procedural conditions (Art. 40-2, Par.2-4).
10  In addition to extending the dispatching period, the 
2003 revision also allowed worker dispatching in services for manufacturing products, which 
had been illegal until then. The dispatching period for manufacturing services was also extended 
from one year to three years in 2007. See Sugeno (2002, pp.206-217, in English) for more 
information about the development of the Act.   
In line with the legal changes, the presence of THS workers in the Japanese labor force 
has  grown significantly,  although the total number of THS workers is still not very large. 
According to the Employment Status Survey, conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications, the proportion of THS workers among the employed was only 
0.47% in 1997, more than doubling to 1.32% in 2002 and more than quintupling to 2.81% in 
2007. The number of THS workers in manufacturing jobs also increased, especially after 2007, 
when the legitimate dispatching period was extended from one year to three years, from about 
80 thousand registered THS workers in 2006 to 200 thousand in 2008 (THS Establishment 
Reports, conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). Relaxations of the 
regulation are also reflected in the Employment Protection Legislature (EPL) index published 
                                                   
9  The 26 specialized fields have no limitation of contract period in worker dispatching. These 26 fields 
include (1) electric calculator programming and design, etc., (2) machinery design and drafting, (3) 
machinery operation for producing sounds and images for broadcast programs, (4) performance in 
broadcast programs, (5) operation of office machinery, (6)interpretation, translation and shorthand, (7) 
secretarial work, (8) filing, (9) market research,    (10) management of financial affairs, (11) the drafting 
of foreign and domestic exchange documents, (12) the presentation and explanation of manufactured 
goods, (13) travel guides and tour conducting, (14) cleaning of building materials, (15) driving, inspection 
and maintenance of construction equipment, (16) building receptionist and guide, (17) research and 
development, (18) planning and developing enterprise systems, (19) creating and editing publications, 
(20) designing goods and advertisements, (21) interior coordinator, (22) announcer, (23) Office 
Automation instruction, (24) telemarketing, (25) sales and engineering business, (26) installation of 
high-end and low-end devices in broadcast programs (Work. Disp. Law Ord., Art.4). 
10  Employers are required to hear opinions from a representative of the majority of workers, etc. (Art. 
40-2, Par.4) 
5by OECD. The EPL index for temporary employment in Japan was reduced from 1.8 in the late 
1980s to 1.3 in 2003, while the same index for the United States remained at 0.3 for the same 
period (OECD 2004). According to the 2003 version of the index, Japan has the 11
th most 
lenient EPL for temporary workers among 28 OECD countries.   
This trend of relaxation was reversed around the late 2000s, however. Especially after the 
two major THS agencies in Japan, Fullcast Co. and Goodwill Inc., suspended their operations 
due to illegal worker dispatching, the media paid lots of attention to the problematic working 
conditions in day-to-day worker dispatching. One prominent example is a series of sensational 
reports about daily-dispatched workers living in a small booth at an Internet café.
11  Debate over 
the regulations for worker dispatching became even harsher after the Lehman shock in 2008, 
when many THS workers were fired. Because of these events, the Japanese Cabinet submitted 
the amendment bill to the Worker Dispatching Act, whereby they are seeking to restrict worker 
dispatching in some situations. For instance, the  April 2010 version of the submitted bill 
proposes that registered dispatched work be banned except for 26 fields of work (see footnote 9), 
and that worker dispatching to manufacturing firms and  daily  hiring dispatching also be 
prohibited. As of October 2011, the submitted bill remains under Diet deliberation. We might 
see a major turning point for the regulation of worker dispatching in Japan if this bill were to be 
passed.   
 
 
2-2. Previous Literature 
Temporary jobs generally offer less to workers than permanent employment, although they can 
                                                   
11  “Many Net café inhabitants rely on their cell phones to arrange day jobs that don’t require a fixed 
address” (The Japan Times, August 29, 2007). About 31% of such Internet refugees are more than 50 
years old, and nearly half of them engage in daily hiring jobs (General Survey on Daily Dispatched 
Workers, 2007, conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare).   
6be better than nothing. Using a British Household Panel Survey from the 1990s, Booth et al. 
(2002) showed that temporary jobs pay lower wages and provide less job training, but they also 
confirmed that more than 30% of workers originally employed in fixed-term contracts obtained 
permanent employment within the survey period. Similarly, Graaf-Zijl et al. (2011) showed 
from labor supply panel data in the Netherlands that temporary work shortens the duration of 
unemployment, although it has no significant larger effect than being unemployed on the hazard 
of finding regular employment.  One of the important explanations behind this 
“better-than-nothing” effect is that part-time employment provides an opportunity to acquire 
general training. A growing number of studies have recently paid more attention to whether a 
temporary job provides any extra economic effects if it is specifically offered by THS agencies.   
Ex ante, it is not possible to predict whether the extra effect would lead workers to 
permanent employment. For example, having a THS job can send either bad or good signals. By 
engaging in THS jobs, some workers may present themselves that they are ready for general 
training (Autor 2003), while for others it may imply that they have no better options. THS 
agencies may also induce efficient matching by exchanging information between workers and 
firms. However, it is also hard to conclude that THS agencies provide better matching than an 
intermediate job exchange office, which can be used for direct-hire jobs. They may also offer 
occasions to accumulate general skills to those who otherwise would have been without 
employment, but again direct-hire temporary jobs can offer the same opportunities. 
Autor and Houseman (2010) tested the empirical effect of agency jobs in the United 
States and found no evidence that THS jobs have a positive effect. Among many empirical 
studies, their study is the first and only one  that identified the THS effect  through 
quasi-experiment. They used data from low-skilled workers in a welfare-to-work program in 
Detroit,  in which participants are rotationally assigned to contractors with differing job 
7placement rates  to temp agencies, and  showed  that temporary help placement may hinder 
subsequent employment and earnings. Autor  et al.  (2011)  further investigated  the same 
placement effect among the distribution of participants’ earnings, rather than using an average, 
and showed that the negative effect of temporary help placement is concentrated in the upper 
tail.
12   
In contrast to their findings, the rest of the empirical studies point in different directions.
13 
Lane et al. (2003) showed  in the  U.S. dataset from  the  Survey of Income and Program 
Participation,  1990-93,  that  working at THS jobs increases the probability of having 
employment compared to being without employment, thereby supporting the use of THS 
placements in welfare programs.  Heinrich  et al.  (2005) reported that welfare recipients in 
Missouri and North Carolina experience high wage growth if they work in THS jobs. With an 
extended dataset, Heinrich et al. (2009) also showed that working in THS jobs has very little 
long-term negative impact on workers’ earnings and employment. Anderson et al. (2009) found 
evidence implying that THS jobs provide better access to higher wage firms among prime-aged 
adults in five U.S. states. For European evidence, using specifically Italian data, Ichino et al. 
(2008) developed a simulation-based ATT sensitivity test and showed that THS workers have a 
significantly higher probability of  obtaining  permanent employment than do  other 
non-permanent workers and the unemployed. On the other hand, from a dataset in Germany, 
Kvasnicka (2009) found that THS work does not increase the probability of obtaining non-THS 
jobs but that THS work reduces the monthly risk of unemployment. Thus, the evidence is quite 
mixed in both the United States and Europe, although discrepancies found in the United States 
                                                   
12  Due to their causal findings that both the negative effect of temporary help placement and the positive 
effect of direct-hire placement are concentrated on the upper tail of conditional earnings of participants, 
Autor et al (2011) cast doubt on the idea that the welfare program in Detroit has indeed helped the least 
advantaged. 
13  One exception is Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008), who found a negative effect from THS jobs, using 
Spanish data.   
8may be attributable to differences in estimation methods (Autor and Houseman, 2010).
14   
Despite a harsh recent policy debate over revising the Worker Dispatching Act, no studies 
have directly quantified the empirical effect of THS jobs in Japan. Esteban-Pretel et al. (2011) 
structurally estimated a job search model by using the Employment Status Survey to test the 
stepping-stone effect of all types of non-regular jobs, including both directly hired part-time 
workers and THS workers. They conclude that non-regular jobs are neither stepping-stones nor 
a dead end with regard to permanent employment, but they did not identify the effects specific 
to THS jobs. Several other studies use samples of THS workers, but none has focused on 
identifying its causal effect on future employment prospects.
15  This paper attempts to provide 
the first causal evidence in Japan, by relying on a recent development in the ATT method and in 
the Japanese questionnaire survey that fits this purpose.   
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3-1. Estimation Strategy 
This paper takes the ATT (Average Treatment effect on the Treated) estimation approach to 
identify the effects of THS work. To be precise, we estimate the propensity score to indicate the 
probability of being treated (i.e., working as a THS worker), and match each treated observation 
                                                   
14  “Substantial differences between the marginal treatment effects of temporary-help placements, 
recovered by our instrumental variables estimates and the average treatment effects recovered by 
estimators in other studies could account for these disparate findings” (Autor and Houseman, 2010, 99). 
15  Genda (2008, in Japanese) used a large sample from the Employment Status Survey and examined the 
significance of previous experience at the same company in transitioning to permanent employment. 
Nakamura (2010, in Japanese) used employment records from one THS agency and descriptively 
analyzed the re-employment rate of THS workers into the same agency. Nagase and Mizuochi (2009, in 
Japanese) analyzed a Labour Force Survey and found significantly positive effects of THS work on the 
probability of being permanently employed, although they did not focus on the selection bias between the 
choice of THS jobs and other unstable jobs. A previous version of this paper (Okudaira et al., 2011, 
available only in Japanese) presented baseline results similar to those in the current paper, but did not 
show any sensitivity results.   
 
9to a non-treated observation that has similar propensity scores. A key assumption underlying 
this method is the CIA (Conditional Independence Assumption), which ensures that selection 
into the treatment depends only on the observables. As will be discussed, our research design 
does not employ a quasi-experiment scheme to satisfy the CIA, nor do we use instrumental 
variable estimations. Instead, we take a completely different approach, which was proposed by 
Ichino et al. (2008): we simulate the unobservable confounders and check the sensitivity of the 
baseline ATT results against  including the simulated confounders  in the propensity score 
estimations. This section briefly summarizes the baseline ATT method and presents the idea of 
the sensitivity test proposed by Ichino et al. (2008).
16   
Let T be the binary variable to indicate the treatment status: T=1 if the  treatment is 
assigned at wave 1 (i.e., the person is employed as a THS worker), and T=0 if the treatment is 
not assigned and the person is in a control group at wave 1 (i.e., the person is unemployed or 
directly hired as a part-time worker).
17  Let  0 Y and  1 Y be the potential outcomes that take a 
value if one if the individual is permanently employed at a later wave and zero otherwise. 
Subscripts in  0 Y and 1 Y indicate the treatment status. Thus,  1 Y indicates the potential outcomes, 
as if the individual  had been treated, and  0 Y indicates the potential outcomes,  as if the 
individual had not been treated, regardless of the actual treatment status. Only one of them is 
observed. We are interested in estimating the ATT (Average Treatment effect on the Treated), 
defined as follows: 
 
) 1 | ( 0 1 = − T Y Y E   (1) 
 
                                                   
16  This section follows largely from the discussion in Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Ichino et al. 
(2008). 
17  The next subsection discusses details about the definition of treatment and controls. 
10Let W be the observable characteristics that can affect the treatment status and the potential 
outcomes. By assuming the following, we can identify the ATT effect from the observed 
outcomes (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983):   
 
W T Y | 0 ⊥   (2) 
1 ) | 1 Pr( 0 < = < W T   (3) 
 
The first assumption is called CIA (Conditional Independence Assumption), which assumes that 
potential outcome  0 Y is independent from treatment status T, conditional on observed 
characteristics W. In other words, the selection into the treatment depends only on W. The 
second assumption is called common support, which assures that each treatment has a 
comparable control that has the same observable characteristics W. Under the two assumptions, 
we have 
 
) 1 | ) , 0 | ( ) , 1 | ( ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 0 1 = = − = = = − T W T Y E W T Y E E T Y Y E .  (4) 
 
That is, under the CIA, we can replace the potential outcome,  0 Y , with the actual outcome of 
the non-treated to estimate the ATT effects in equation (1), conditional on W.   
It is desirable that we always have a comparable control unit with exactly the same values 
for the observed characteristics, W, for each treatment unit. However, in general, it is hardly 
possible to condition on all the observable characteristics. To avoid this dimensionality problem, 
we estimate the probability of being treated, or the propensity score ) | 1 ( ) ( W T p W p = = , and 
make the condition on  ) (W p instead of on W in estimating the ATT effect: 
 
11) 1 | ) 0 ), ( | ( ) 1 ), ( | ( (
)) 1 ), ( | ( ( ) 1 | (
0 1
0 1 0 1
= = − = =
= − = = − ≡
T T W p Y E T W p Y E E
T W p Y Y E E T Y Y E
　　
τ
  (5) 
 
In order to construct comparable combinations of treatment and control pairs, we employ a 
nearest-neighbor matching algorithm, where a treatment unit is matched with a control unit that 
has the closest value of the propensity score to that of a treatment unit.   
Identification of true ATT effects relies  entirely  on the fact that the research design 
satisfies the CIA. Unfortunately, we do not have any explicit reason to believe that the CIA 
holds in our case. In fact, CIA is not a testable assumption (Ichino et al., 2008). To obtain 
reliable ATT estimates, we apply an approach suggested by Ichino et al. (2008). In particular, we 
simulate a binary confounder, U, which induces the CIA to hold: 
 
) | 1 Pr( ) , , | 1 Pr( 1 0 W T W Y Y T = ≠ =   (6) 
) , | 1 Pr( ) , , , | 1 Pr( 1 0 U W T U W Y Y T = = =   (7) 
 
The binary confounder can be considered as a “skill”  (Ichino  et al.,  2008) that is usually 
unobserved but that selects individuals into a treatment. Assuming that equations (6) and (7) are 
satisfied, the unobserved binary confounder is characterized by specifying the parameters   
 
ij p j Y i T U W j Y i T U ≡ = = = = = = = ) , | 1 Pr( ) , , | 1 Pr(   (8) 
 
with  { } 1 , 0 , ∈ j i . If our baseline ATT estimation satisfies the CIA, the ATT estimates should be 
robust to including a binary confounder with the observable characteristics, W. In this vein, we 
can test the sensitivity of our baseline results to the inclusion of binary confounders, assuming 
12that the binary confounder replicates true unobserved characteristics that, if any can, could 
induce a violation of the CIA.
18   
This paper simulates the confounder by using the available information about the actual 
observed characteristics. Appendix Table 2 presents examples of confounders that have been 
characterized by four parameters, ij p , where the parameters are replicated from the actual 
distribution of observed characteristics. For instance, parameter  11 p for a confounder like 
“married” is 0.20, as presented in the last row of Appendix Table 2. This value is calculated by 
taking an average of male dummies for the sample, who had been treated at wave 1 (i =1) and 
had obtained a permanent job at wave 5 (j=1).   
To obtain the results with unobserved binary confounders, we first attribute a value of U 
to each subject, according to his or her treatment and outcome status:  { } 1 , 0 , ∈ j i .  In an 
example of the binary confounder, such as “married,” one is assigned a value of one with the 
probability of 0.20 if he or she had been treated at wave 1 (i =1), and had obtained a permanent 
job at wave 5 (j=1). Then we include a value of U as one of the explanatory variables in the 
propensity score specifications and match a treatment unit to a control unit using this new 
propensity score to obtain the ATT estimate. We repeat this procedure 100 times to obtain the 
ATT estimate, which is an average of ATT estimates over the distribution of the simulated U.
19   
One of the  advantages  of this method is that there is  no risk of  mis-specifying  the 
selection process, but that we can still obtain the point estimates. Moreover, parameters can be 
chosen to make the distribution of U similar to the empirical distribution of observable binary 
characteristics. Although we never know which U represents a true unobserved confounder, this 
approach can still examine the validity of baseline estimates by repeatedly simulating many 
                                                   
18  The sensitivity test proposed by Ichino et al. (2008) has been applied in some empirical studies, such 
as Cornelissen et al. (2010) and Maertens et al. (2008). 
19  Sensitivity estimations are conducted by Stata command, sensatt, written by Nannicini (2007). 
13kinds of confounders, thereby narrowing down the possible candidates that could contaminate 
the baseline result. Finally,  and more important, this method allows us to  avoid  “ad-hoc” 
identification strategies such as finding appropriate instrumental variables or exogenous 
variations in programs. This feature is especially appealing to countries where social experiment 




In order to have comparable treatment and control groups, this paper draws on the 
Questionnaire  Survey on the Life of  Temporary  Workers and Their  Job Search  Behavior 
(hereafter referred to as the Temporary Worker Survey). The Temporary Worker Survey is an 
Internet survey conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), 
which is an affiliated research agency of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI).
20  This survey was aimed at contingent  workers and the unemployed  in Japan, 
including part-time workers directly hired by firms or THS workers indirectly hired through the 
temporary help agencies. The main survey was conducted in January 2009 (wave  1),  and 
succeeded by four follow-up surveys in July 2009 (wave 2), January 2010 (wave 3), July 2010 
(wave 4), and January 2011 (wave 5).
21  All surveys ask questions pertaining to changes in 
individual attributes, such as employment status. In addition, the main survey (wave 1) included 
numerous detailed items for ascertaining factors such as preference parameters, including time 
discounting rates, household factors, and degree of economic deprivation.
22  The response rate 
                                                   
20  Information about RIETI is available in the following website (in English): http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/. 
The survey was conducted through a Japanese survey company, Intage, Inc.: 
http://www.intage.co.jp/english/ 
21  We found no statistically significant differences in the group means for the attrition rate by treatment 
status, which will be defined in the next section. 
22  The summaries and reports of the survey results can be found on the following websites of the 
14ranges from 55% to 73%, with approximately 1,000 to 2,000 respondents on each wave. All 
respondents are 18 years of age or older, and are not students, homemakers, or retirees as of 
wave 1.   
The advantages of using the Temporary Worker Survey come from its wide coverage 
among non-regular workers, along with the unemployed. Given the low proportion of THS 
workers  (i.e.,  2.81% in 2007, according to the Employment Status Survey), the Temporary 
Worker Survey efficiently extracted many types of contingent workers by using the information 
from a screening survey sent to a large respondent pool.
23  In addition, former surveys aimed at 
THS workers used firms and temporary work agencies as the means of survey distribution to 
actual temporary workers.
24  In contrast, the Temporary Worker Survey was conducted through 
direct communication with individual temporary workers through the Internet. Given the fact 
that this survey has no extraction based on the attributes of the firms that were supplied with 
questionnaire, it is possible to infer that the samples covered a wide range of temporary workers. 
Finally, but most important, the Temporary Worker Survey was also conducted in a way that 
enabled us to construct the comparable treatment and control. As will be discussed in the next 
section, both the treatment and controls are extracted from the survey, and thus, the same 
questionnaire is used for both groups. Heckman  et al.  (1997) suggest using  the same 
questionnaire for both treatment and controls to reduce the bias in matching estimates. That we 
did so is an advantage of this paper since some of the previous studies with ATT estimations 
                                                                                                                                                     
Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (available only in Japanese): 
Wave 1, January 2009 http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/projects/research_activity/temporary-worker/01.html 
Wave 2, July 2009 http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/projects/research_activity/temporary-worker/02.html 
Wave 3, January 2010 http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/projects/research_activity/temporary-worker/03.html 
Wave 4, July 2010 http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/projects/research_activity/temporary-worker/04.html 
23  The survey population consists of those who registered their bank account information in Yahoo! 
Research.   
24  Examples include Survey Concerning the Actual Conditions of Day-to-day Employment for 
Temporary Workers (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) and Survey on Actual Conditions for 
Temporary Workers (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). 
15extracted their treatment and control groups from separate surveys or datasets.
25   
Despite these advantages, a word of caution is in order regarding use of the Temporary 
Worker Survey, because the sample  does not  necessarily  represent the whole working 
population in Japan. Table 1 compares summary statistics for the Temporary Worker Survey 
with some government statistics. The overall comparison indicates that the respondents in the 
Temporary Worker Survey, at least on average, have (1)  a  relatively high  educational 
background  and  (2)  a  relatively high  female  ratio—and,  in  the  case of temporary workers 
employed for less than a month (i.e., short-term THS workers), (3) a relatively high ratio of 
older workers. The following ATT estimates, therefore, indicate the effects of THS work that 
accrue mainly to these groups. 
 
 
3-3. Treatment and Control 
Our analysis begins by setting the treatment and control groups with information about the main 
employment status reported at wave 1. In particular, the treatment is assigned to respondents 
whose main employment status in the month before wave 1 (December 2008) is “temporary 
help service worker with a fixed-term contract of more than one month (hereafter, long-term 
THS worker).”
26  We compare the outcome of the treatment group against the outcome of two 
kinds of control groups: 
 
C1: the unemployed   
                                                   
25  For example, Ichino et al.’s (2008) data collection was based on the data that was being collected. The 
data on temporary workers—i.e., the treatment group—were collected via submissions from the 
temporary agency, whereas data on people not seeking permanent employment—i.e., the control 
group—were collected through a telephone survey. 
26  Note that THS workers are those temporarily hired by the temporary work agency (i.e., registered THS 
or Touroku Gata Haken), and those who are regularly employed by the temporary work agency (i.e., 
regular THS or Joyo Gata Haken) are excluded from our sample.   
16C2: directly hired part-time worker   
 
C1 denotes the respondents who replied that their main employment in December 2008 was 
“not in an employment but seeking a job.” C2 denotes the respondents who replied that their 
main employment in December 2008 was “directly hired part-time worker with a fixed-term 
contract of more than one month,” or “directly hired part-time worker with a contract of no 
specified period.” In order to satisfy the common support assumption in equation (3), we make 
sure to exclude the control units that worked in occupations in which worker dispatching is 
prohibited. In other words, we exclude the occupations in which  ) | 1 Pr( W T = equals zero.
27 
For all the treatment and control groups, we compare the outcomes in the subsequent four 
waves of the Temporary Worker Survey: June 2009 (wave 2); December 2009 (wave 3); June 
2010 (wave 4); and December 2010 (wave 5).  As an outcome variable Y, we employ two 
variables to examine the economic effect of THS work: (1) a dummy variable, which takes one 
if a respondent works on a permanent contract (seisyain in Japanese) at a subsequent wave, and 
zero otherwise; and (2) the hourly wage.
28  For those who do not hold any jobs, hourly wages 
are set to zero. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables by treatment 
status.  About 9% of respondents who had been originally working in THS jobs obtained 
permanent jobs by two years from the start of the survey. Note that our sample size is relatively 
small but still comparable to the one in Ichino et al. (2008).
29   
It should be noted that our research design contain two kinds of possible bias by defining 
the treatment and control groups in this way. The first possibility is selection bias, which could 
                                                   
27  Okudaira (2011, in Japanese), the previous and preliminary version of this paper, did not exclude this 
possibility, although it does not change most of our results. 
28  The wage rate per hour is calculated as follows: hourly wage ratio = monthly earnings /(work days in a 
month × labor hours per day). Extreme values are treated as missing values, although we have only a few 
of such cases. 
29  The numbers of treated units and matched controls units are 281 and 133, respectively in Tuscany; 230 
and 131, respectively in Sicily (Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini 2008).   
17arise due to the possible violation of the CIA. Unfortunately, our research design does not 
necessarily ensure the random assignments of THS jobs to each respondent, and this is the 
reason we conduct the sensitivity analysis,  as already explained in section 3.1.
30  A  second 
possible bias could arise because  we defined respondents’  treatment statuses  by their main 
employment statuses  in December 2008. The observations in our sample start working at 
different points in time, and those who had started working at similar points in time, but who 
obtained  permanent jobs before December  2008,  are excluded from the sample.  Thus, our 
observations have a lower propensity to be permanently hired, and if this propensity differs 
systematically between treatment and control groups, the baseline  estimates would contain 
attrition bias. After conducting the sensitivity analysis, we will come back to this issue and 




4-1. Baseline ATT estimation   
One important key for obtaining plausible ATT estimates is to specify the propensity score 
models that take out the comparable treatment-control pairs from a sample. In specifying a 
plausible model for propensity scores, we make sure that our models (1) satisfy the balancing 
property, (2) use the predetermined characteristics for W in section 3-1, and (3) have sufficient 
explanatory power.
31  Table 3 reports the averages for the predetermined variables, W, used in 
the propensity score estimations, separately for treatment status. Averages are also shown for the 
observations in control groups that are actually matched to the treatment in ATT estimations. 
                                                   
30  Selection into the treatment is based not only on workers’ characteristics, but also on firms’ attributes. 
Unfortunately, we cannot overcome this problem in the current estimations strategy. In fact, the literature 
has failed to account for this possibility. Even in Autor and Houseman (2010), who used almost random 
assignments of agency jobs, firms’ decisions to use agency jobs may not be necessarily random. 
31  We evaluate the explanatory power of our models by McFadden’s adjusted R-squared. 
18The difference between control and treatment groups became smaller in terms of most variables 
(not all) when compared to the matched controls, indicating that our method  picks up 
appropriate comparable units, at least in terms of averages.   
As an example of the propensity score estimates, Appendix Table 1 shows the propensity 
score estimation results that are used in the estimation of ATT for the probability of obtaining a 
permanent job at wave 2, where long-term THS workers are compared to directly hired 
part-time workers (C2). It is important to note that our propensity score specification does not 
provide consistent estimates since we use choice-based samples.
32  According to Heckman and 
Todd (2009), even if the sampling weight is unknown in choice-based samples, it has been 
shown that the odds ratio of the propensity score in a miss-specified model is still monotonically 
related to the odds ratio of the true propensity score. Since we use a nearest-neighbor algorithm, 
the usual propensity score is used to match a treatment to the control.
33  Appendix Figure 1 
presents histograms for estimated propensity scores, whereas Appendix Figure 2 shows scatter 
plots for the hourly wage at wave 2 and estimated propensity scores. Dashed lines indicate the 
common support region.  Only observations within the common support are used in the 
nearest-neighbor matching. As can be seen, we have sufficient overlap in propensity scores for 
both groups. The following ATT results are based on the similar propensity score estimations 
specified separately for each of the four waves and the two kinds of outcome variables. All of 
them pass the balancing test.
34   
                                                   
32  The Temporary Worker Survey employed a stratified random sampling scheme by types of 
employment contract (i.e., THS workers or directly hired part-time workers) to ensure that a given 
number of respondents would be included in the survey. Thus, propensity scores are not estimated 
consistently, because the dependent variable is determined in accordance with the treatment-to-control 
ratio imposed by the survey design. 
33  In the case of the logit propensity score, matching on the log odds ratio gives identical estimates to 
matching on the (unknown) true propensity score, because the odds ratio preserves the ranking of the 
neighbors (Heckman and Todd, 2009, S233). 
34  Note that in some specifications we excluded a variable to indicate the number of child or dummy 
variables for the fathers’ education in order to satisfy the balancing property. 
19Table 4 shows the baseline ATT estimates with long-term THS work as a treatment. 
Analytical standard errors are reported following Abadie and Imbens (2006). When we compare 
the probability of being permanently employed for long-term THS workers to the one for the 
unemployed (C1), we find no significant differences in all waves. On the other hand, long-term 
THS workers earn significantly higher hourly wages than the unemployed do. Even two years 
after the start of the survey, the THS workers still earned 645 yen (i.e., about US$8.3 as of 
September 15, 2011) more in hourly wages than did those who were unemployed at wave 1. A 
different picture emerges when we compare the treatment to directly hired part-time workers 
(C2): long-term THS workers are significantly less likely to obtain permanent employment than 
are  the directly  hired workers at  waves  4  and  5. We observe no statistically significant 
differences in their hourly wages, except at  wave 4, where THS workers earn slightly, but 
statistically significantly, higher hourly wages than do the directly hired part-time workers. To 
summarize, assuming that the CIA holds, our baseline ATT estimates indicate that THS work 
provides a means to earn a living for at least two years when compared to staying without 
employment, and even to earn a higher hourly wage than in directly hired part-time work, while 
we find some evidences that THS work deters attainment of permanent employment.   
 
 
4-2. Sensitivity Analysis   
The  CIA is a  fundamental assumption for  identifying  the true treatment effect in the ATT 
estimation framework. Unfortunately, our research design does not entail any explicit grounds to 
believe that the CIA holds in the baseline case presented in the last section. This paper addresses 
the possibility of violating the CIA by taking an approach suggested by Ichino et al. (2008), as 
already discussed in section 3-1. To be precise, we simulate the unobserved confounders, based 
20on the distribution of the predetermined characteristics, W; include it as one of the explanatory 
variables in the propensity score estimation; and repeat this process 100 times to obtain the 
averaged ATT. 
Table  5  reports  the results  from the sensitivity analysis  with directly hired part-time 
worker as a control group. The first row replicates the baseline ATT estimates presented in Table 
4, and each cell shows estimation results from separate sensitivity analyses where confounder U 
is replicated from a listed predetermined variable. Note that our inference provides conservative 
conclusions, because we calculate variance as a weighted sum of both between-imputation and 
within-imputation variances (Nannicini 2007).
35  Our sensitivity analysis  reveals that the 
baseline conclusion remains in most of the cases but not all the time. Columns (1) to (4) of 
Table 5 show that  a  long-term THS job has a  negative impact on the probability of  being 
permanently employed in waves  4 and 5, although some of the estimated effects are only 
weakly  significant.  Our conservative estimates  at wave 5  indicate that, given the observed 
covariates and a simulated confounder U fixed, the impact of originally working at THS jobs 
ranges from zero to -19%.  Because we never know which confounder resembles a true 
unobservable, we cannot conclude whether the true effect would be negative or zero. However, 
we can conclude that it is unlikely that long-term THS work provides a stepping-stone to a 
                                                   
35  Let m be the number of imputations, and let  k T T A ˆ   and 
2
k se be the point estimate and the 
estimated variance of the ATT estimator at the k-th imputed data set (k=1,2,..,m).  T T A ˆ is obtained 
by averaging  k T T A ˆ over m replications. The variance of our estimate is given by 
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21permanent job, at least within two years, because we never observed a significant and positive 
impact on the probability of permanent employment, even after repeatedly simulating several 
types of confounders. In a similar vein, columns (5) to (8) of Table 5 show that a long-term THS 
worker could possibly earn higher hourly wages at wave 4 than directly hired part-time workers 
do. No significant wage effect is observed at the other waves.
36   
Columns (1) to (8) of Table 6 show similar estimation results but with the unemployed as 
a control. Again, our baseline results are moderately robust to possible violation of the CIA: we 
observe no significant impact on the probability of being permanently employed, but THS work 
offers a higher hourly wage than staying without employment  in some cases of simulated 
confounders for waves 3 through 5. Because the hourly wage is set to zero for those who do not 
hold any jobs at each wave, the positive wage effect could reflect both possibilities: that THS 
agencies offer access to higher paying jobs than if prospective employees were searching on 
their own and that THS jobs, at most, provide the employment opportunities. To separate out 
these effects, we restrict our sample to those who hold any jobs at each wave. In other words, 
we conduct a similar analysis as in columns (5) to (8) of Table 6 but exclude those without 
employment in each wave.
37  The results are shown in columns (9) to (12).  Although  we 
obtained significantly positive effects for the baseline estimates of wave 3, we no longer 
observe any significant wage differences across sensitivity estimates. Therefore, temp agencies 
in Japan do offer access to some jobs, but these jobs do not necessarily pay higher wages than 
jobs that an unemployed person would find on his or her own. 
 
                                                   
36  We observed heterogeneous effects across waves, although we do not know the reason. Since the 
survey was conducted every six months, seasonality may be one reason. Another reason may be related to 
the days of the week on which the survey was conducted; wave 2 was conducted over the weekend, while 
other waves were conducted during weekdays. 
37  Due to our small sample size, we cannot restrict our sample to those who hold any permanent jobs at 
each wave. 
224-3. Further Robustness Tests   
This section presents results from two kinds of robustness tests. First, we restrict our sample 
only to those who are looking for permanent jobs to take into account the fact that many female 
workers in Japan voluntarily choose non-permanent jobs. This is partly because the Japanese tax 
system has maintained disproportionate financial incentives for household dependents who do 
not work full time (Houseman and Osawa, 2003).
38  Another reason relates to the Japanese case 
law. Since the Japanese courts have established that “a labor relationship in which there has [sic] 
been repeated renewals of a short term contract is converted into one with a contract without a 
definite term” (Sugeno,  2002, p.  193), some directly hired part-time workers consider 
themselves to be employed “permanently,” even if they are employed on a temporary basis. 
Indeed, according to the survey question, less than half of the respondents in our sample are 
willing to be permanent workers (see footnote 41). We have to exclude those respondents from 
our estimation; otherwise, our negative baseline estimates on permanent employment status may 
contain biases because workers do not want permanent jobs in the first place.   
For this purpose, Tables 7 and 8 present  the estimation results  when we restrict our 
sample only to those who are looking for permanent jobs as of wave 1.
39  While the effect on 
permanent employment status is no longer significant at waves 4 and 5 in Table 7, the signs of 
the estimates are still negative in most cases. Even after the sensitivity analysis, no significant 
positive effect is observed on the probability of being permanently employed. In contrast, wage 
differences compared to the unemployed are statistically significant, and became even larger in 
Table 8, indicating the possibility that temp agencies offer quick access to the higher paying 
                                                   
38  “…workers earning up to 1,030,000 yen per year do not pay taxes on their income, and, if they are 
married, their spouse [sic] may claim a dependent deduction from his or her [sic] income 
taxes”(Houseman and Osawa, 2003, p.199). Some part-time workers also receive health insurance and 
pension benefits. See Houseman and Osawa (2003) for details.   
39  Respondents who selected “yes” to the question at wave 1, “Would you like to work as a permanent 
worker in the future?” A dummy to indicate the willingness to obtain a permanent job is added to the 
propensity score specifications for panel A.   
23jobs. 
A second robustness test examines the magnitude of the attrition bias in our baseline 
estimates. As explained in section 3.3, we defined respondents’ treatment status by their main 
employment status in December 2008, so our observations start working at different points in 
time. This situation may cause a bias to our estimates if our respondents have a lower propensity 
to be permanently employed and if this propensity differs systematically between treatment and 
control groups. In fact, it is not sufficient to have observations with the same start date of work, 
as  was  done  in most of the previous studies, because workers may change their jobs by 
registering at different temp agencies. It  is ideal here  to test treatment effects among new 
entrants to the labor market since they have no previous experience, either in THS or in directly 
hired part-time jobs; thus, no attrition occurs in terms of the potential prospect of obtaining a 
permanent job.
40 
We address  this  issue by using the  wave 2 survey questions about respondents’ past 
working experience at THS jobs. In particular, we restrict our sample to those who had never 
worked in THS jobs as of June 2002, 2004, and 2007, two to seven years before wave 2 of the 
survey. Tables 9 and 10 show the estimation results. Again, most of our estimates in Table 9 on 
the probability of being permanently employed are not always significantly negative after the 
sensitivity test, although the estimated signs are never significantly positive. In Table 10, we can 
observe significantly positive effects on the hourly wage of wave 3. The baseline estimates at 
waves 4 and 5 are negative, but very sensitive against including simulated confounders.   
To summarize, since our conservative estimates never show any significant and positive 
effects on permanent employment status at subsequent waves, we confirmed that long-term THS 
                                                   
40  We can identify whether the respondents are re-entrants to the labor market after childbirth and 
child-bearing. Unfortunately, however, we do not have a sufficient number of observations to obtain 
reliable estimates.   
24jobs do not offer a stepping-stone to permanent employment. While we observed a non-positive 
effect on the future prospect of permanent employment, we still observed some positive effects 
of long-term THS work on hourly wages when compared to those who otherwise had been 
without employment. Thus, even to those who are willing to obtain a permanent job, long-term 
THS work offered a quick way to make money, but did not offer better access to permanent 




Despite recent and rapid changes in the Japanese legal environment for temporary help service 
jobs, no studies have directly identified whether these jobs benefit Japanese workers. This paper 
examined the empirical effects of THS jobs, by applying the ATT method to data from Japanese 
surveys  conducted from 2008 through 2011. We considered THS  work as a treatment, and 
compared the respondents’ employment status and hourly wage in subsequent waves to those of 
the control groups, such as the unemployed or directly hired part-time  workers.  Instead of 
ensuring that the CIA is necessarily satisfied in our research design, we identified the treatment 
effect by relying on a sensitivity analysis proposed by Ichino et al. (2008): we simulate the 
unobservable confounders that can induce self-selection, and check the sensitivity of the 
baseline ATT results against including the simulated confounders in the propensity score 
estimations.   
Our results are similar to the ones found in some previous works, such as that of Autor 
and Houseman (2010). First, we observe some evidence that THS jobs have a negative impact 
on the probability of an individual’s being permanently employed in later waves, relative to 
directly hired part-time jobs. This effect is not always significant after the sensitivity analysis, 
25but we never found any significant positive effect. Second, THS workers earn significantly 
higher hourly wages than the unemployed do. This positive effect is mostly significant even 
after the sensitivity analysis, especially when we restrict our sample to those who are seeking 
permanent employment. Thus, this paper adds further evidence to the literature to show that a 
THS job is better than no job but that it does not provide any positive extra effect on future 
prospects for obtaining permanent employment.   
It is important to note that our results are weak, in the sense that we assume that our 
simulated confounders represent the true unobserved factors that could, if any can, induce a 
selection into the treatment. Because we never know which confounder resembles a true 
unobservable, we cannot conclude whether the true effect would be negative or zero. However, 
we have narrowed down the possible empirical impact that THS jobs would have on workers’ 
employment prospects:  a  long-term THS job  is unlikely to provide a stepping-stone to a 
permanent job, since we never observed any significant and positive impact on the probability 
of permanent employment, even after repeatedly simulating several types of confounders. We 
must keep in mind that our results should be further scrutinized, and that our analysis does not 
provide estimates for the removal of the Act, per se. Nonetheless, we can draw the following 
policy implications from our results: first, dispatched work has offered a means of getting quick 
earnings to those who otherwise would have been unemployed, at least in the short run. Thus, 
immediate removal of registered dispatched work, as was proposed in the amendment plan of 
April 2010, may hinder the welfare of many workers, especially those who are not willing to 
work as permanent employees.
41  Second, dispatched work is not a stepping-stone to permanent 
employment. Rather, if anything, it becomes a trap of endless precariousness to those who are 
                                                   
41  About 57% of THS workers were not seeking permanent jobs at wave 1 of the Temporary Worker 
Survey, December 2008. This paper presents the estimation results, separately for a whole sample and for 
a sample of those who are seeking permanent jobs. 
26seeking a permanent job. When taken together, these findings do not lend  support  to the 
amendment plan of  removing  dispatched works; rather,  they  suggest  the need to design a 
fixed-term contract that directs permanent-job seekers to stepping-stone jobs.   
 
 
Appendix. Short-term THS job as a treatment 
As a special case of our treatment, we also examined the effect of short-term THS workers, 
respondents whose main employment status was “THS worker with a fixed-term contract of 
less than one month” in December 2008. Because a job of short duration indicates that workers 
have few opportunities to accumulate human capital, we do not expect that short-term THS 
jobs improve workers’ future employment status. This speculation is confirmed in Appendix 
Tables 3 through 6. In essence, we obtained very similar results to the case of long-term THS 
workers as treatment: short-term THS work does offer a means of quick earnings (columns 5 
through 8 of Appendix Table 6), but at the same time, significant evidence demonstrates that 
they do not offer stepping-stones to permanent jobs (columns 1, 3, and 4 of Appendix Table 3, 
and column 4 of Appendix Table 5). Note that the estimated effects of short-term THS work 
are not directly  comparable to those  of long-term THS work because the  observation 
characteristics for the two treatment groups are different, and their control groups are not 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Survey; Comparison to the Government Statistics 
THS Worker THS Worker THS Worker
short term long term short term
Looking for a permanent job?  (Yes =1) 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.30
Reasons to choose the current job
 (multiple choice)
To earn a living 0.21 0.13 0.37
To adjust onw's own time schedule 0.53 0.26 0.48
Until obtaining a permanent job 0.25 0.23 0.25
Age
Total 38.13 35.96
 Under 19 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07
20～24 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.25
25～29 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.21
30～34 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.16
35～39 0.22 0.28 0.17 0.14
40～49 0.33 0.23 0.20 0.12
50～59 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.03
60 and over 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01
Male 0.26 0.15 0.44 0.58
Education
Junior high school 0.03 0.00 0.05
High school 0.29 0.32 0.45
Junior college or vocational school 0.39 0.34 0.26
University or graduate school 0.30 0.33 0.21
No. of observations 381 439 8339 698
conducted by MHLW MHLW
survey period Oct 2008 Jun-Jul 2007
Note. RIETI stands for Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry. RIETI is an affiliated organization of Ministry of








Dec 2008 （wave 1)
Temporary Worker Survey
(used in this paper)
RIETI
 
31Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Outcome Variables (Whole Sample) 
mean N mean N mean N
Permanently hired at 
Wave 2　(Jun. 2009) 0.040 274 0.064 109 0.048 168
Wave 3　(Dec. 2009) 0.064 235 0.101 99 0.039 152
Wave 4　(Jun. 2010) 0.065 200 0.103 78 0.051 137
Wave 5　(Dec. 2010) 0.087 172 0.120 75 0.065 123
Hourly wage (yen) at
Wave 2　(Jun. 2009) 1064.416 256 386.993 95 879.665 163
Wave 3　(Dec. 2009) 1026.908 202 369.041 82 969.018 138
Wave 4　(Jun. 2010) 985.975 228 407.326 94 880.026 154
Wave 5　(Dec. 2010) 962.780 199 410.233 88 814.661 134
Directly hired











32Table 3. Summary Statistics for the Pre-treatment Variables 
Age 36.14 37.45 39.83 36.29 39.03
Age squared 1349.08 1467.33 1668.54 1393.41 1624.11
Male*married 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10
Male 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.37 0.57
Married 0.40 0.62 0.71 0.12 0.11
No. of Children 0.28 0.62 1.02 0.15 0.20
Permanently employed right after graduation 0.75 0.74 0.71 0.61 0.63
Father graduated from high school 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.46 0.51
Father graduated from university 0.29 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.26
Graduated from junior high school/ high school 0.28 0.30 0.38 0.36 0.32
Graduated from junior college or vocational school 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.27 0.28
Graduated from the univ. or grad. school 0.38 0.33 0.24 0.37 0.39
Looking for a permanent job 0.42 0.29 0.24 0.68 0.72
No. of observations 274 87 168 59 109





"Matched Controls" are individuals who belong to the control sample and are used in the nearest-neighbor propensity score matching.
Matching is restricted to the sample in a common support.
THS workers
(long term)
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34Table 5. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Long-term THS vs. Directly Hired) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.06 0.02 -0.10 -0.20 129.56 -50.92 155.16 109.01
(0.05) 0.05 (0.05) (0.06) (86.49) (180.63) (89.70) (99.04)
Confounder such as
Looking for a permanent job -0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.17 142.26 -41.88 143.03 82.35
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (114.04) (252.50) (131.16) (118.92)
Young -0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.14 123.46 -100.46 162.25 75.29
(0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.10) (121.59) (293.15) (121.52) (109.60)
Male -0.07 0.03 -0.10 -0.13 117.93 9.15 153.74 106.33
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (101.48) (189.09) (104.00) (106.98)
Married -0.12 0.02 -0.09 -0.19 112.33 -100.78 151.63 30.61
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (132.76) (305.15) (144.77) (121.21)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.17 117.42 10.15 164.95 93.60
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (103.51) (235.50) (104.44) (105.67)
Graduated from high school -0.08 0.03 -0.11 -0.17 109.49 -23.46 169.99 98.27
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (106.90) (224.02) (104.28) (108.23)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.16 118.54 -10.89 164.55 91.98
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (110.50) (259.46) (104.08) (105.55)
Hyperbolic -0.07 0.03 -0.10 -0.17 120.48 1.19 159.45 99.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (101.47) (199.50) (102.97) (101.95)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
Note: Analytical standard errors in parentheses if baseline estimates; imputed standard errors in parentheses otherwise. Each cell
presents an estimate from separate estimations.
A. Whole sample
 
35Table 6. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Long-term THS vs. Unemployed) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) 0.01 -0.09 0.03 0.02 508.36 466.69 505.32 645.48 308.13 690.13 217.65 140.37
(0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (284.22) (208.59) (236.83) (340.32) (411.30) (213.20) (228.28) (381.72)
Confounder such as
Looking for a permanent job -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 442.45 552.36 609.07 427.42 202.65 328.60 50.69 -52.40
(0.11) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (452.24) (296.13) (284.81) (530.31) (457.97) (391.68) (403.88) (586.02)
Young -0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02 477.74 518.22 592.28 590.39 356.08 493.42 233.04 111.00
(0.11) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (402.02) (279.75) (273.56) (336.02) (301.93) (345.85) (282.38) (501.34)
Male -0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 443.94 533.38 620.88 546.46 312.18 383.61 241.76 44.33
(0.12) (0.20) (0.15) (0.18) (450.32) (299.10) (283.69) (450.76) (286.60) (389.87) (311.45) (693.47)
Married -0.04 -0.16 -0.10 -0.06 404.90 492.20 312.66 350.44 265.56 -21.88 168.20 94.15
(0.12) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (560.55) (388.29) (426.95) (524.51) (304.84) (610.40) (331.21) (594.71)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 0.01 468.80 538.16 567.48 607.93 219.59 438.53 211.47 63.64
(0.10) (0.18) (0.19) (0.13) (393.76) (264.44) (252.87) (327.42) (426.31) (361.88) (277.16) (536.28)
Graduated from high school -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.01 459.06 533.75 580.85 556.05 337.91 438.53 234.48 119.34
(0.10) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (380.47) (263.70) (252.10) (408.58) (274.37) (361.88) (266.88) (486.63)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.01 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 424.06 524.64 582.30 579.12 246.52 468.01 227.60 83.65
(0.10) (0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (366.94) (249.53) (249.47) (376.26) (397.95) (354.61) (264.41) (557.66)
Hyperbolic -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 455.76 515.68 553.51 567.68 243.21 474.46 17.55 147.92
(0.10) (0.16) (0.18) (0.14) (369.67) (254.55) (268.90) (408.68) (392.35) (388.40) (364.55) (458.16)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at Hourly wages only for the employed at
A. Whole sample






36Table 7. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Long-term THS vs. Directly Hired) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.21 0.06 -0.07 -0.11 9.94 301.69 146.19 240.09
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (153.97) (328.99) (147.80) (152.03)
Confounder such as
Young -0.20 0.06 -0.14 -0.13 -52.29 236.60 196.00 198.42
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (186.25) (374.91) (175.00) (168.23)
Male -0.15 0.06 -0.11 -0.10 -40.20 306.32 205.87 215.36
(0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (186.60) (363.18) (165.10) (162.90)
Married -0.19 0.05 -0.15 -0.13 -66.30 210.42 192.94 203.46
(0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (217.73) (410.16) (186.90) (172.68)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.20 0.06 -0.15 -0.12 -46.70 284.19 214.28 202.85
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (180.84) (371.09) (170.27) (167.08)
Graduated from high school -0.19 0.06 -0.16 -0.15 -94.88 243.63 182.28 189.00
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) (200.86) (375.76) (177.58) (167.14)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.18 0.04 -0.18 -0.12 -45.04 141.68 178.65 196.72
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (211.22) (467.99) (172.10) (176.56)
Hyperbolic -0.19 0.07 -0.14 -0.12 -57.51 248.41 167.35 183.41
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (188.25) (374.59) (185.21) (167.63)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
B. Only those who are looking for
permanent jobs
Note: Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (128:32) at wave 2, (96:25) at wave 3, (95:25) at wave 4, and (83:21) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (127:33) at wave 2, (95:27) at wave 3, (94:25) at wave 4, and
(83:21) at wave 5.
 
37Table 8. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Long-term THS vs. Unemployed) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.02 >0.00 0.03 0.06 730.21 692.61 233.18 811.60
(0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.10) (132.58) (328.47) (174.10) (148.02)
Confounder such as
Young -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 645.67 623.11 283.42 764.52
(0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (218.40) (305.00) (208.85) (191.04)
Male -0.06 -0.11 0.06 -0.03 584.81 588.70 417.91 729.91
(0.13) (0.20) (0.11) (0.17) (246.86) (365.42) (266.05) (218.72)
Married -0.10 -0.19 -0.03 -0.03 525.44 515.54 357.32 692.80
(0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (265.83) (400.03) (223.95) (226.70)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.01 667.05 671.77 340.88 798.52
(0.09) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) (200.10) (294.30) (219.57) (176.53)
Graduated from high school -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.03 627.72 626.81 416.63 747.29
(0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) (218.85) (319.09) (234.42) (211.90)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.02 661.18 668.72 383.12 787.22
(0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (199.79) (289.08) (238.94) (175.10)
Hyperbolic -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.01 638.25 668.43 341.28 775.12
(0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (218.17) (313.73) (220.35) (186.02)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
B. Only those who are looking for
permanent jobs
Note. Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (129:46) at wave 2, (97:30) at wave 3, (95:32) at wave 4, and (83:30) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (128:50) at wave 2, (96:30) at wave 3, (94:34) at wave 4, and
(83:30) at wave 5.
 
38Table 9. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Long-term THS vs. Directly Hired) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.09 0.06 -0.14 -0.17 56.30 -243.06 -50.71 63.54
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (104.12) (170.47) (100.29) (125.18)
Confounder such as
Looking for a permanent job -0.07 0.04 -0.11 -0.16 146.89 -169.10 -19.52 70.37
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (137.18) (300.50) (195.22) (160.32)
Young -0.02 0.05 -0.08 -0.19 125.31 -154.97 -14.01 62.66
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (150.14) (286.79) (177.52) (160.95)
Male -0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.13 138.88 -242.65 -51.05 66.26
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (132.83) (218.54) (146.14) (148.93)
Married -0.08 0.04 -0.11 -0.19 116.33 -198.12 -39.73 29.83
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (154.73) (311.82) (205.16) (161.30)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.12 161.35 -234.47 -39.97 80.84
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (124.79) (211.78) (141.77) (144.82)
Graduated from high school -0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.12 136.81 -215.00 -47.84 78.84
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (135.25) (203.68) (149.13) (146.90)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.12 121.12 -219.18 -49.99 80.17
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (146.17) (254.79) (170.07) (147.52)
Hyperbolic -0.04 0.07 -0.05 -0.11 153.71 -202.37 -52.56 87.98
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (124.64) (205.04) (135.97) (145.31)
Hourly wages at Permanently employed at 
C. Only those who had never worked in
THS jobs in 2002, 2004, and 2007
Note: Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (87:43) at wave 2, (83:43) at wave 3, (76:35) at wave 4, and (70:39) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (87:39) at wave 2, (82:42) at wave 3, (75:43) at wave 4, and
(70:39) at wave 5.  
39Table 10. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Long-term THS vs. Unemployed) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.01 359.75 695.58 -486.71 -950.42
(0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10) (249.55) (361.73) (265.71) (353.53)
Confounder such as
Looking for a permanent job 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 336.16 485.18 328.13 -16.83
(0.12) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (415.21) (374.10) (441.06) (798.77)
Young 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 339.51 573.09 68.22 -478.15
(0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (369.10) (356.82) (537.50) (790.75)
Male 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 310.05 621.12 279.04 59.83
(0.13) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (468.36) (375.70) (504.74) (793.84)
Married -0.01 -0.15 -0.11 -0.04 350.34 579.67 102.47 262.15
(0.13) (0.25) (0.21) (0.18) (497.19) (406.74) (441.42) (645.75)
Permanently employed right after graduation 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 321.69 689.13 81.85 -678.01
(0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (347.46) (332.86) (588.11) (717.15)
Graduated from high school 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 319.17 682.87 -37.80 -509.76
(0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (364.67) (341.09) (579.66) (819.92)
Graduated from university or grad school 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 328.63 697.92 -66.07 -486.30
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (353.63) (331.73) (590.36) (812.99)
Hyperbolic 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 316.50 713.35 33.15 -656.55
(0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (362.78) (313.99) (587.98) (735.25)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
C. Only those who had never worked in
THS jobs in 2002, 2004, and 2007
Note. Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (87:32) at wave 2, (96:32) at wave 3, (76:31) at wave 4, and (79:33) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (100:39) at wave 2, (95:32) at wave 3, (75:43) at wave 4, and
    
 












No. of children -0.7852
(0.1561)
Permanently employed right after graduation 0.6729
(0.2893)
Father graduated from high school 0.3917
(0.2971)
Father graduated from university 0.1024
(0.3337)
Graduated from junior college or vocational school -0.0591
(0.2951)
Graduated from the univ. or grad. school 0.6054
(0.3126)





McFadden's Adjusted R-squared 0.194
No. of observations 442
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Propensity score is estimated by logit model. 
dummy variable which takes one if long-term THS worker, zero if directly-
hired part time worker
This table shows the results from the propensity score estimation for the ATT




41Appendix Figure 1. Histograms for propensity scores by treatment status 
Note: Propensity scores are calculated from the results in Appendix Table 1.
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42Appendix Figure 2. Propensity score and hourly wage at wave 2   
Note: Propensity scores are calculated from the results in Appendix Table 1.
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43Appendix Table 2. Simulating Confounders (vs. Directly Hired Part-time Workers) 
Simulated ATT on the probablility that a worker is permanently hired at Wave 5 
p11 p10 p01 p00 p1. p0.
No confounder (baseline) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.20 0.06 100
Confounder such as
Looking for a permanent job 0.60 0.43 0.63 0.17 0.44 0.20 -0.17 0.10 85
Young 0.60 0.54 0.50 0.32 0.54 0.33 -0.14 0.10 73
Male 0.07 0.18 0.63 0.11 0.17 0.15 -0.13 0.11 63
Maried 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.76 0.38 0.72 -0.19 0.10 93
Permanently employed right after graduation 0.67 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.72 -0.17 0.07 85
Graduated from high school 0.27 0.32 0.13 0.42 0.32 0.40 -0.17 0.08 85
Graduated from university or grad school 0.40 0.32 0.50 0.27 0.33 0.28 -0.16 0.08 82
Hyperbolic 0.33 0.31 0.38 0.27 0.31 0.28 -0.17 0.07 85
Note: ATT estimates with simulated confounders are replicated from column (4) of Table 5.
SE %baseline











44Appendix Table 3. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Short-term THS vs. Directly Hired) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.06 0.01 -0.13 -0.13 27.60 -561.41 -118.80 -64.76
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (82.69) (152.96) (113.15) (99.05)
Confounder such as
Looking for a permanent job -0.11 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14 27.63 -199.38 -79.19 -23.40
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (110.63) (269.52) (156.72) (128.10)
Young -0.08 0.01 -0.10 -0.11 13.00 -460.84 -113.29 -56.65
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (97.07) (245.35) (124.13) (103.92)
Male -0.08 0.01 -0.11 -0.13 7.52 -478.47 -134.12 -68.37
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (100.39) (253.86) (146.13) (109.95)
Married -0.12 0.00 -0.11 -0.14 -9.09 -281.05 -93.16 -74.44
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (127.76) (274.71) (155.27) (125.05)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.12 19.57 -468.75 -127.32 -63.77
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (92.63) (255.15) (117.91) (107.29)
Graduated from high school -0.08 0.01 -0.10 -0.12 5.52 -464.41 -124.61 -47.10
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (101.97) (253.39) (138.23) (113.72)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.08 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 10.12 -497.16 -119.80 -58.66
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (99.19) (260.05) (139.28) (107.59)
Hyperbolic -0.07 0.01 -0.10 -0.08 21.31 -509.40 -139.92 -53.91
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (92.39) (234.12) (127.44) (108.00)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
Note: Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (239:89) at wave 2, (182:66) at wave 3, (183:60) at wave 4, and (150:57) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (235:84) at wave 2, (182:75) at wave 3, (180:68) at wave 4, and
(148:59) at wave 5.
A. Whole sample
 
45Appendix Table 4. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Short-term THS vs. Unemployed) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.07 -0.05 -0.38 0.03 318.53 411.86 19.45 639.59
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (338.74) (295.96) (212.69) (204.80)
Confounder such as
Looking for a permanent job -0.03 -0.14 -0.12 0.00 385.71 427.83 253.06 471.04
(0.10) (0.20) (0.19) (0.13) (350.16) (313.28) (311.52) (327.73)
Young -0.04 -0.13 -0.28 0.01 402.67 451.98 91.43 573.63
(0.10) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (332.09) (279.09) (281.79) (276.20)
Male -0.05 -0.24 -0.11 -0.02 423.31 484.02 250.85 486.27
(0.10) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (342.47) (265.47) (307.62) (299.54)
Married -0.06 -0.27 -0.21 -0.04 361.36 415.26 149.67 423.29
(0.11) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (474.87) (336.36) (282.71) (342.03)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.03 -0.15 -0.32 0.01 361.36 431.60 204.72 569.57
(0.10) (0.20) (0.18) (0.13) (414.96) (293.69) (325.76) (268.91)
Graduated from high school -0.04 -0.12 -0.32 0.01 435.44 446.70 48.91 574.48
(0.10) (0.19) (0.18) 0.13 (319.83) (271.06) (255.62) (265.07)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.04 -0.16 -0.25 0.00 448.16 463.74 158.27 568.71
(0.10) (0.20) (0.21) (0.13) (325.69) (282.20) (319.29) (288.72)
Hyperbolic -0.04 -0.12 -0.26 0.01 406.13 437.82 135.77 511.93
(0.10) (0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (324.04) (282.93) (306.32) (323.30)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
Note: Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (239:69) at wave 2, (182:55) at wave 3, (183:53) at wave 4, and (154:48) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (235:60) at wave 2, (182:51) at wave 3, (180:46) at wave 4, and
(152:46) at wave 5.
A. Whole sample
 
46Appendix Table 5. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Short-term THS vs. Directly Hired) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.09 -0.04 -0.13 -0.25 160.73 60.13 -16.63 -105.42
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (146.05) (322.04) (152.11) (138.34)
Confounder such as
Young -0.11 -0.01 -0.19 -0.28 42.57 74.61 -0.10 -77.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (198.89) (362.17) (181.23) (170.59)
Male -0.14 -0.02 -0.19 -0.30 -9.06 13.13 -35.01 -78.58
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (212.87) (375.19) (183.76) (168.24)
Married -0.14 -0.04 -0.17 -0.28 47.10 23.43 -23.30 -106.63
(0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19) (205.25) (427.72) (196.74) (184.71)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.10 -0.01 -0.17 -0.26 61.10 59.12 8.65 -75.97
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (190.12) (338.28) (179.28) (168.78)
Graduated from high school -0.14 -0.03 -0.21 -0.25 27.34 47.86 -46.48 -95.42
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (203.44) (367.00) (191.91) (175.19)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.16 -0.01 -0.19 -0.28 -2.37 44.69 -19.46 -83.42
(0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (220.06) (366.90) (181.34) (165.85)
Hyperbolic -0.11 0.00 -0.18 -0.27 50.48 67.86 -51.41 -78.39
(0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (193.42) (338.55) (189.65) (171.87)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
Note: Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (118:34) at wave 2, (90:23) at wave 3, (93:28) at wave 4, and (79:23) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (112:26) at wave 2, (88:24) at wave 3, (91:30) at wave 4, and
(77:22) at wave 5.
B. Only those who are looking for
permanent jobs
 
47Appendix Table 6. ATT Estimates with Simulated Confounders (Short-term THS vs. Unemployed) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
No confounder (baseline) -0.03 -0.18 0.02 -0.01 718.45 795.68 324.27 644.31
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (196.71) (203.52) (137.78) (112.61)
Confounder such as
Young -0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.00 675.24 744.36 384.64 599.11
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (183.58) (206.99) (165.78) (136.98)
Male -0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 624.85 757.03 406.77 579.14
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (204.63) (201.76) (179.05) (165.11)
Married -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 0.00 633.57 724.87 416.26 608.60
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (206.56) (214.54) (170.60) (139.33)
Permanently employed right after graduation -0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.00 664.98 749.14 402.70 615.49
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (194.25) (200.26) (165.40) (131.68)
Graduated from high school -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 655.65 738.59 424.75 619.32
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (197.10) (199.92) (171.83) (138.44)
Graduated from university or grad school -0.02 -0.10 0.01 0.01 662.18 741.93 401.30 629.92
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (192.43) (208.83) (171.32) (133.49)
Hyperbolic -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.00 666.61 763.01 406.18 568.26
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (187.76) (202.46) (165.97) (143.29)
Permanently employed at  Hourly wages at
Note: Analytical standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations (Treatment: Control) in the estimations of the probability
of being permanently employed is (118:53) at wave 2, (90:44) at wave 3, (93:41) at wave 4, and (79:33) at wave 5. Number of
observations (treatment: control) in the estimations of hourly wages is (116:53) at wave 2, (90:42) at wave 3, (91:38) at wave 4, and
(77:32) at wave 5.
B. Only those who are looking for
permanent jobs
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